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Abstract
AI Safety is a major concern in many deep learning ap-
plications such as autonomous driving. Given a trained
deep learning model, an important natural problem is how
to reliably verify the model’s prediction. In this paper,
we propose a novel framework — deep verifier networks
(DVN) to verify the inputs and outputs of deep discrimina-
tive models with deep generative models. Our proposed
model is based on conditional variational auto-encoders
with disentanglement constraints. We give both intuitive
and theoretical justifications of the model. Our verifier net-
work is trained independently with the prediction model,
which eliminates the need of retraining the verifier net-
work for a new model. We test the verifier network on out-
of-distribution detection and adversarial example detection
problems, as well as anomaly detection problems in struc-
tured prediction tasks such as image caption generation. We
achieve state-of-the-art results in all of these problems.
1. Introduction
Deep learning models provide state-of-the-art perfor-
mance in various applications such as image classification,
caption generation, sequence modeling and machine trans-
lation. However, such performance is based on the assump-
tion that the training and testing data are sampled from the
similar distribution [9]. On out-of-distribution (OOD) sam-
ples, deep learning models can fail silently by producing
high confidence in their incorrect predictions even for com-
pletely unrecognizable or irrelevant inputs [1]. For instance,
the models trained with MNIST can produce 91% confi-
dence on random noise [13]. Similar case also shown in
Fig. 1. Facing the distribution mismatch, the prediction
probability from a softmax output is likely to poorly corre-
spond to the true certainty. Unfortunately, there is very little
control over test distribution in real-world deployments due
to dynamically changing environments or malicious attacks
[11]. In fact, well calibrating the predictive uncertainty of
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Figure 1. A network trained on CIFAR-10 with ten-class softmax
output will predict the resized 32x32x3 CVF logo (OOD sample
w.r.t. CIFAR-10) as deer with high confidence.
DNNs is important for many production systems, e.g., au-
thentication devices, medical diagnosis and self-driving ve-
hicles [20].
Being overconfident to nonsensical inputs has raised the
concern of artificial intelligence (AI) safety, which seeks
to develop a model that can identify whether they have en-
countered new kinds of inputs, i.e., OOD samples [1]. For-
mally, the OOD detection can be formulated as a binary
classification/verification problem to verify a test sample is
from training distribution (i.e., in-distribution, ID) or suffi-
ciently different from it (i.e., OOD). Notably, the number
of OOD training data can be virtually infinite.
[13] proposed a baseline using the maximum value of
the posterior softmax probabilities. It can be improved by
adding small controlled permutations for the input or us-
ing temperature scaling in the softmax function [21]. An-
other possible improvement is not only modeling the in-
distribution samples, but also introducing the OOD samples
in the training stage [14]. However, listing all possible OOD
distributions is usually intractable. Most prior works on this
topic typically re-train a classification network with a mod-
ified structure or an additional optimization objective. This
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can make it hard to maintain the original classification per-
formance and be computationally expensive. Their hyper-
parameters (e.g., threshold for verification) also need to be
tuned with OOD examples, which are usually not accessible
in the real-world.
Moreover, the previous methods are essentially based on
the statistics of output/feature space of the softmax-based
classifier, which is not applicable to the structured predic-
tions, e.g., image caption.
In this paper, we propose to verify the predictions of deep
discriminative models by using deep generative models that
try to generate the input given the prediction of the discrim-
inative model. We call this concept ”deep verifier networks
(DVN)”.
We provide a concrete algorithm for the deep verifier.
The high level idea is simple: given an input-output pair
(x, y) from the predictive model p(y|x), we inversely train
a verification model p(x|y), in order to estimate the density
of x given prediction y. In order to estimate this likelihood,
we design a novel model based on a conditional variational
autoencoder imposed with disentanglement constraints. To
compute p(x|y), we condition on y that are already pre-
dicted by the classifier to be verified. We assume the pre-
diction y is correct and try to see whether the input x is
consistent with y, which following a verification protocol.
Although many different kinds of density estimators can be
also used in theory, we argue that the design of our model
is robust to OOD samples and adversarial attacks, due to
the use of latent variables with explicit and accurate density
estimations.
It not only can be trained without OOD samples, but
also eliminates the need of OOD validation set for hyper-
parameter (e.g., threshold) tuning. This is a more realistic
setting, since we can not predict what kind of OOD may oc-
cur (e.g., CIFAR-10 as the in-distribution, and the OOD can
be SVHN, ImageNet, LSUN or adversarial sample). More-
over, it does not require the reprocessing of the input sam-
ples, changing the architecture or re-training with additional
loss function for the original classification model. There-
fore, the prediction task of the original DNNs will not be
distracted, since it can be fixed when we train the DVN.
The proposed solution achieves the state-of-the-art per-
formance for detecting either OOD or adversarial samples
in all tested classification scenarios, and can be generalized
well for structured prediction tasks (e.g., image caption). In
Sec 3.4, we analysed why DVN is useful for both OOD (low
density in p(x)) and Adv sample (high density in p(x)).
2. Related Work
Detecting OOD samples in low-dimensional space using
density estimation, nearest neighbor and clustering analy-
sis have been well-studied [26]. However, they are usually
unreliable in high-dimensional space, e.g., image [21].
OOD detection with deep neural networks has been re-
cently developed. [13] found that pre-trained DNNs have
higher maximum softmax probability for in-distribution ex-
amples than anomalous one. Based on this work, [21] pro-
posed that the maximum softmax probability can be more
separable between in/out-of distribution samples when us-
ing adversarial perturbations for pre-processing in the train-
ing stage. [7] augmented the classifier with a confidence
estimation branch, and adjusted the softmax distribution us-
ing the predicted confidence score in the training stage. [19]
trained a classifier simultaneously with a GAN, and an addi-
tional objective of the classifier is to produce low confidence
on generated samples. [14] proposed to use the enormous
real images rather than the generated OOD samples to train
the detector. [31] applied a margin entropy loss over the
softmax output, in which a part of training data is labeled as
OOD sample and the partition of in-distribution and OOD
is changing to train an ensemble classifier. These improve-
ments based on [13] require re-training the model with dif-
ferent modifications.
[20, 27] claimed to explore the DNNs’ feature space
rather than the output posterior distribution, which is ap-
plicable to the pre-trained softmax neural networks. [20]
obtained the class conditional Gaussian distribution using
Gaussian discriminative analysis, and the confidence score
is defined using the Mahalanobis distance between the sam-
ple and the closest class-conditional Gaussian distribution.
By modeling each class of in-distribution samples indepen-
dently, it showed remarkable results for OOD and adversar-
ial attacks detection. Noticing that its reported best per-
formance also needs the input pre-processing and model
change. Besides, [21, 31, 20] need OOD examples for
hyper-parameter-validations and require two forward and
one backward passes in the test stage. Another limitation
of the aforementioned methods is that they can only target
for the classifier with softmax output.
Recently, [5] proposed an unsupervised OOD detector
by estimating the Watanabe-Akaike Information Criterion,
which is in turn estimated using an ensemble of generative
models. The goal of our model is essentially different from
WAIC in that rather than just detect OOD samples, DVN
aims to verify the predictions of a supervised predictive
model. DVN unify detection of three different anomalies
into one model: OOD samples, adversarial samples, and in-
correct predictions made by the predictive models.
3. Methodology
This paper targets at the problem of verification of deep
predictive models. Let x ∈ X be an input and y ∈ Y
be the response to be predicted. The in-distribution sam-
ples are sampled from the joint data-generating distribution
pin(x, y) = pin(y|x)pin(x). We propose to reverse the order
of prediction process of modeling p(y|x) and try to compute
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Figure 2. The architecture of our proposed Deep Verifier Network
(DVN). We extract the embedding c from the ground-of-truth label
y of in-distribution example x in the training stage while using
the trained and fixed classifier or captioner prediction y′ of testing
image in testing stage.
the conditional probability p(x|y). To compute p(x|y), we
condition on y already predicted by the classifier to be ver-
ified. We assume the prediction y is correct and try to see
whether the input x is consistent with y.
The predictive model to be verified pθ(y|x) is trained on
a dataset set drawn from the pin(x, y), and may encounter
the sample from both pin(x, y) and pout(x, y) (i.e., out-of-
distribution or adversarial samples) at test time. Note there
is some subtle difference between OOD and adversarial
examples, we assume OOD samples have low density in
pin(x), while adversarial samples may have high density in
pin(x) if we admit Gaussian noise to be injected into the
data, but for y predicted by the predictive model from x,
(x, y) should have low density in pin(x, y).
Our goal is to verify the pair (x, y) predicted by the pre-
dictive model given x. The basic idea is to train a verifier
network qφ(x|y) as an approximation to the inverse poste-
rior distribution p(x|y). Modelling p(x|y) instead of p(x)
as a verification has many advantages: (1) Usually p(x) is
much more diverse than the conditional distribution p(x|y),
so modelling p(x|y) is much easier than modelling p(x).
(2) Modelling p(x|y) allows us to provide a unified frame-
work for verifying OODs, adversarial examples, and mis-
classifications of the classifier.
3.1. Basic Model
Our basic model is a conditional variational auto-
encoder shown in Fig. 2. The model is composed of two
deep neural networks, a stochastic encoder pφ(z|x) which
takes input x to predict a latent variable z and a decoder
p(x|z, y) which takes both latent variable z and the label
y to reconstruct x. The encoder and decoder are jointly
trained to maximize the evidence lower bound (ELBO):
log p(x|y) ≥ Eq(z|x)[log p(x|z, y)]− KL(q(z|x)||p(z))
(1)
The equality holds if and only if q(z|x) = p(z|x, y), where
p(z|x, y) is the ground truth posterior.
3.2. Disentanglement constraints for anomaly de-
tection
One problem of training the conditional variational auto-
encoder is that the decoder can ignore the effect of input la-
bel y, passing all information through the continuous latent
variable z. This is not desirable as we want to use the de-
coder to model the conditional likelihood p(x|y), not p(x).
A simple solution to this problem is to add a disentangle-
ment constraint to the model, such that z and y are inde-
pendent features. In other words, we want to minimize the
mutual information between z and y. Namely, besides the
ELBO loss, we also minimize the mutual information esti-
mator Iˆ(z, y) together with the loss, yielding:
L = −Eq(z|x)[logp(x|z, y)+λIˆ(y, z)]+KL(q(z|x)||p(z))
(2)
In this paper, we use deep Infomax [15] as the proxy for
minimizing the mutual information (MI) between z and y.
The mutual information estimator is defined as:
Iˆ(z, y) = Ep(y,z)[−s+(−T (y, z))]−Ep(y)p(z)[s+(T (z, y))]
(3)
where s+ is the softplus function and T (y, z) is a discrim-
inator network. Just like GANs, T is trained to maximize
Iˆ(y, z), in order to get a better estimation of the (JS-version)
mutual information, while L is trained to minimize Iˆ(y, z).
3.3. Measuring the likelihood as anomaly score
Our anomaly verification criterion is to measure the log-
likelihood logp(x|y) for test samples. Importance sam-
pling is a possible solution to provide an unbiased estimate
of p(x|y). Following IWAE [3], the k-sample importance
weighting estimate of the log-likelihood is a lower bound of
the ground truth likelihood L(x|y) = Ex∼p(·|y)[log p(x|y)]:
Lk(x|y) = Ez1,...,zk∼q(z|x)[log
1
k
k∑
i=1
p(x, zi|y)
q(zi|x) ] (4)
We use the fact that Lk(x|y) → L(x|y), k → ∞ to esti-
mate the likelihood. As will be discussed below, we want
the decoder q(x|z, y) be evaluated on the same input dis-
tribution for z as it is trained. The quantities Lk(x|y) is a
monotonic series of lower bounds of exact log-likelihood
log p(x) (L1 ≤ L2 ≤ · · · Lk ≤ log p(x)). It has the prop-
erty that when k → ∞, Lk → log p(x). We choose, say
k = 100, as a sufficiently good approximation to the exact
likelihood.
In our algorithm, the distribution of z feed into decoder
q(x|z, y) during training is p∗(z) = ∫ q(z|x)pd(x). How-
ever, this distribution p∗(z) can be drastically different from
the prior p(z). So instead of using p(z) as a prior for the de-
coder network, we use p∗(z) as the prior distribution for
z, and estimate the likelihood of x under this directed gen-
erative model, where p∗(x, z) = p∗(z)p(x|z). In order to
estimate the density of p∗(z), we propose to train an addi-
tional discriminatorDz to distinguish p(z) and p∗(z). Dz is
trained to discriminate the real distribution of latent variable
p∗(z) =
∫
pd(x)e(z|x)dx (pd(x) is the data distribution of
x, e(z|x) is the encoder network) and Gaussian prior distri-
bution p(z), with ordinary GAN loss. Both p∗(z) and p(z)
are easy to sample, so a discriminator is easy to train with
the samples. The optimal discriminator Dz is
Dz =
p(z)
p(z) + p∗(z)
(5)
After Dz is trained and p(z) is known (i.e., Gaussian), we
can compute p∗(z) = 1−Dz(z)Dz(z) p(z).
We classify a sample x as an OOD sample if the log-
likelihood is below the threshold δ and the x is an in-
distribution sample, otherwise.
x ∈
{
in-distribution (ID), if log-likelihood ≥ δ
OOD, if log-likelihood < δ
(6)
We set δ to the threshold corresponding to 95% true posi-
tive rate (TPR), where the TPR refer to the probability of
in-distribution validation samples are correctly verified as
the in-distribution. Therefore, the threshold selection in our
model is only tuned on in-distribution validation datasets,
while most of previous methods also need the OOD sam-
ples for hyper-parameter validation [21, 20]. We note that
the distribution of OOD samples is usually not accessible
before the system deployment.
3.4. Theoretical Justification
In the problem the loss function we optimize can be writ-
ten as:
L =L1 + λL2 = Ex,y∼pd [−Eq(z|x)[logp(x|z, y)]
+ KL(q(z|x)||p(z)) + λEq(z|x)[Iˆ(y, z)]]
(7)
where p(x|z, y) is the decoder we are training. Also de-
note p(x|z) = Ey∼p(y)[p(x|z, y)], p(x) = Ez∼p(z)[p(x|z)],
p(x|y) = Ez∼p(z)[p(x|z, y)], p(x, y) = Ez∼p(z)[p(x, y|z)].
We have the following theorem that justifies the two parts
of losses above.
Theorem 1 • (i) −L1 is a variational lower bound of
Ex,y∼pd [log p(x|y)].The bound is tight when q is
enough expressive and z, y are conditionally indepen-
dent given x.
• (ii) Assume x, y is sampled from pd(x, y) and z is sam-
pled from q(z|x). The condition that z, y are indepen-
dent random variables is a necessary condition of that
the generative model p(z, x, y) = p(y)p(z)p(x|z, y)
and the encoder q(z|x) are perfect. More precisely, as-
sume that p(x, y) = pd(x, y), and q(z|x) = p(z|x, y).
Then we have p∗(z|y) = p∗(z), where p∗(z|y) =
Ex∼pd(x|y)[q(z|x)], and p∗(z) = Ex∼pd [q(z|x)]. This
justifies the loss L2.
Proof 3.1 For (i), we have:
−L1 = Ex,y∼pd [Eq(z|x)[logp(x|z, y)]− KL(q(z|x)||p(z))]
= Ex,y∼pd [Eq(z|x)[logp(x, z|y)− log p(z|y)]
− KL(q(z|x)||p(z))]
= Ex,y∼pd [Eq(z|x)[logp(x|y)]− KL(q(z|x)||p(z|x, y))]
≤ Ex,y∼pd [log p(x|y)]
(8)
The bound is tight if E[KL(q(z|x)||p(z|x, y))] = 0,
which is equivalent to E[KL(q(z|x)||p(z|x))] = 0 if z, y
are conditionally independent give x.
For (ii), we notice that pd(x, y) = p(x, y) means
pd(x|y) = p(x|y) and p(x) = pd(x). So it’s easy to
verify p∗(z|y) = Ex∼p(x|y)[p(z|x, y)] =
∑
x p(x, z|y) =
p(z|y) = p(z) = p∗(z).
3.5. Intuitive Justifications
We now present an intuitive justification for the above
algorithm. First, consider our training loss:
L = Eq(z|x)[logp(x|z, y)]− KL(q(z|x)||p∗(z)) (9)
It is well known that deep neural networks can be gen-
eralized well for in-distribution samples, but their behav-
iors are undefined for out-of-distribution samples. Sup-
pose x is an out-of-distribution sample, with y be the cor-
responding output of the classifier. Then the behavior of
the stochastic encoder q(z|x) is undefined. We denote
p∗(z) =
∫
q(z|x)pd(x) the distribution to train q(x|y, z).
There are two cases: (1) q(z|x) maps x to z with low
density in p(z). This case can be easily detected because
p∗(z) is easily computable. In this case the second term
in Eq. 9 is a large negative number. (2) q(z|x) maps x to
z with high density in p∗(z). Then since we train the de-
coder network with the input distribution p∗(z), so (z, y)
is an in-distribution sample for the decoder p(x|z, y). Thus
p(x|y, z) should maps to some in-distribution x′ with class
label y. Since input x is an OOD sample and reconstruction
x′ is an in-distribution sample, so the reconstruction has to
be bad. In this case, the first term in Eq. 9 is a large negative
number. So in both cases, the log-likelihood score derived
from DVN should be a large negative number. This is why
our model is robust to both adversarial and OOD samples.
3.6. Using Density Estimators other than VAEs
In theory, we can also use density estimators other than
conditional VAE (such as auto-regressive models and flow-
based models) to estimate p(x|y). However, all these mod-
els have drawbacks that make them not suitable for this
task. Auto-regressive models are quite slow and prone to
completely ignore the conditioned code y [2]. Flow-based
models are not robust to adversarial examples thus some-
times assigns higher likelihood on OOD samples than in-
distribution samples [24]. We have intuitively explained in
Sec. 3.5 why our cVAE based model does not suffer from
the same problem as flow-based models.
4. Experimental results
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our
DVN on several classification benchmarks, and show its po-
tential for image caption task. We choose the DenseNet [16]
and ResNet [12] as the backbone of our classifier.
For evaluation, we measure the following metrics as
indicator of the effectiveness of the certainty scores in
distinguishing in-/out-of distribution images. Following
the definition in previous works, the in-distribution images
are positive samples, while OOD is the negative sample.
• True negative rate (TNR) or false positive rate (FPR)
at 95% true positive rate (TPR). Let TP, TN, FP, and FN
denote true positive, true negative, false positive and false
negative, respectively. We measure TNR = TN / (FP+TN)
or FPR = FP / (FP+TN), when TPR = TP / (TP+FN) is
95%. • Area under the receiver operating characteristic
curve (AUROC). The ROC curve is a graph plotting TPR
against the false positive rate = FP / (FP+TN) by varying
a threshold. The area under ROC is the probability that
an in-distribution sample has a higher certainty score than
an OOD sample. • Area under the precision-recall curve
(AUPR). The PR curve is a graph plotting the precision
= TP / (TP+FP) against recall = TP / (TP+FN) by vary-
ing the threshold. •Verification accuracy is defined by 1−
minδ {pin(L ≤ δ)p(x ∈ pin) + pout(L > δ)p(x ∈ pout)},
where L is the predicted certainty score, p(x ∈ pin) or
p(x ∈ pout) is the probability of appearing of positive
or negative samples in the test set. It corresponds to
the maximum classification probability over all possible
thresholds.
Following the definition in previous works, the in-
distribution images are positive samples, while OOD is the
negative sample. We note that AUROC, AUPR and ver-
ification accuracy are threshold(δ)-independent evaluation
metrics.
4.1. Verifying out-of-distribution samples for clas-
sification
Datasets. The Street View Housing Numbers (SVHN)
dataset [25] consists of color images depicting house num-
bers, which range from 0 to 9. Images have a resolution
of 32×32. For our tests, we use the official training set
split which contains 73,257 images, and the test set split,
which has 26,032 images. The CIFAR-10/100 dataset [17]
consists of 10/100 classes colour images. The training set
has 50,000 images, while the test set has 10,000 images.
The TinyImageNet dataset1 is a subset of the ImageNet
dataset [6]. Its test set contains 10,000 images from 200
different classes. It contains the original images, downsam-
pled to 32×32 pixels. The Large-scale Scene UNderstand-
ing dataset (LSUN) [34] has a test set with 10,000 images
from 10 different classes. The LSUN (crop) and LSUN (re-
size) are created in a similar downsampling manner to the
TinyImageNet datasets. The Uniform noise and Gaussian
noise dataset are with 10,000 samples respectively, which
are generated by drawing each pixel in a 32×32 RGB im-
age from an i.i.d uniform distribution of the range [0, 1] or
an i.i.d Gaussian distribution with a mean of 0.5 and vari-
ance of 1 [21].
Setups. For fair comparisons, the backbones of classifier
used here are the 100-layer DenseNet with growth rate 12
[21, 20] and 34-layer ResNet [20]. They are trained to clas-
sify the SNHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and Tiny-ImageNet
datasets, of which test set is regarded as the in-distribution
dataset in our testing stage. The dataset different from its
training dataset is considered as OOD. We use four conv
or deconv layer for the encoder and decoder structure, and
z is a 128-dimension vector. In classification setting, c is a
one-hot vector. Discriminator is a two-layer fully connected
layer network with sigmoid output and binary cross-entropy
loss. The hyper-parameters in previous methods [21, 20]
need to be tuned on a validation set with 1,000 images from
each in-distribution and OOD pair. Noticing that the thresh-
old of DVN is tuned on in-distribution only. This aligns a
more realistic scenario, since the OOD in real-world appli-
cations is usually uncontrollable.
Effects of the threshold and performance across
datasets. How the hyper-parameters (e.g., δ) generalize
across different OOD datasets is a challenging aspect of the
system deployment. The most of previous methods target
at the case that we have a small set of OOD samples, the δ
can be calibrated by evaluating the verification error at dif-
ferent δ. However, the more realistic scenario is that we do
not have access to the OOD examples that sampled from the
OOD in testing stage.
A promising trend is improving the performance on an
unknown OOD when using the model tuned on a similar
OOD [21, 20]. We argue that our DVN is essentially free
from such worries, since it does not need any OOD sample
in the validation.
To investigate how the threshold affects the FPR and
TPR, Fig. 3 shows their relationship when the CIFAR-10
is used for training and meet different OOD in test stage
with DenseNet backbone. Noticing that the TPR (red axis)
is used for in-distribution dataset CIFAR-10 (red dashed
1https://tiny-imagenet.herokuapp.com/
Validation on OOD samples Validation on adversarial samples
In-Dist OOD TNR@TPR 95% AUROC Verification acc. TNR@TPR 95% AUROC Verification acc.
ODIN / SUF / Our ODIN / SUF /Our
CIFAR-10 SVHN 86.2/90.8/92.4 95.5/98.1/99.0 91.4/93.9/95.1 70.5/89.6/91.2 92.8/97.6/98.1 86.5/92.6/94.2
DenseNet T-ImageN 92.4/95.0/96.2 98.5/98.8/99.0 93.9/95.0/97.3 87.1/94.9/95.6 97.2/98.8/99.1 92.1/95.0/97.4
LSUN 96.2/97.2/98.6 99.2/99.3/99.3 95.7/96.3/96.8 92.9/97.2/97.9 98.5/99.2/99.3 94.3/96.2/97.5
CIFAR-100 SVHN 70.6/82.5/85.2 93.8/97.2/97.3 86.6/91.5/93.4 39.8/62.2/70.5 88.2/91.8/92.2 80.7/84.6/86.3
DenseNet T-ImageN 42.6/86.6/89.0 85.2/97.4/97.4 77.0/92.2/93.8 43.2/87.2/89.1 85.3/97.0/97.8 77.2/91.8/93.0
LSUN 41.2/91.4/93.7 85.5/98.0/98.2 77.1/93.9/94.9 42.1/91.4/93.6 85.7/97.9/98.3 77.3/93.8/95.4
SVHN CIFAR-10 71.7/96.8/97.4 91.4/98.9/99.2 85.8/95.9/96.5 69.3/97.5/97.8 91.9/98.8/99.1 86.6/96.3/97.4
DenseNet T-ImageN 84.1/99.9/100 95.1/99.9/99.9 90.4/98.9/99.2 79.8/99.9/99.9 94.8/99.8/99.9 90.2/98.9/99.4
LSUN 81.1/100/100 94.5/99.9/99.9 89.2/99.3/99.6 77.1/100/100 94.1/99.9/100 89.1/99.2/99.5
CIFAR-10 SVHN 86.6/96.4/98.4 96.7/99.1/99.2 91.1/95.8/97.3 40.3/75.8/78.5 86.5/95.5/96.1 77.8/89.1/92.2
ResNet T-ImageN 72.5/97.1/98.0 94.0/99.5/99.6 86.5/96.3/96.9 96.6/95.5/97.1 93.9/99.0/99.2 86.0/95.4/96.3
LSUN 73.8/98.9/99.0 94.1/99.7/99.7 86.7/97.7/97.9 70.0/98.1/98.9 93.7/99.5/99.5 85.8/97.2/98.0
CIFAR-100 SVHN 62.7/91.9/93.5 93.9/98.4/98.8 88.0/93.7/94.8 12.2/41.9/46.2 72.0/84.4/86.3 67.7/76.5/79.4
ResNet T-ImageN 49.2/90.9/91.2 87.6/98.2/98.5 80.1/93.3/94.3 33.5/70.3/74.6 83.6/87.9/90.3 75.9/84.6/89.8
LSUN 45.6/90.9/92.3 85.6/98.2/98.6 78.3/93.5/95.7 31.6/56.6/63.5 81.9/82.3/85.2 74.6/79.7/81.9
SVHN CIFAR-10 79.8/98.4/99.4 92.1/99.3/99.9 89.4/96.9/97.5 79.8/94.1/94.5 92.1/97.6/98.7 89.4/94.6/94.8
ResNet T-ImageN 82.1/99.9/100 92.0/99.9/99.9 89.4/99.1/99.2 80.5/99.2/99.7 92.9/99.3/99.5 90.1/98.8/99.3
LSUN 77.3/99.9/99.9 89.4/99.9/99.9 87.2/99.5/100 76.3/99.9/99.9 90.7/99.9/99.8 88.2/99.5/99.8
Table 1. OOD verification results of image classification under different validation setups. All metrics are percentages and the best results
are bolded. The ResNet for SUF [20] and our is ResNet34 [12], while ODIN [21] use more powerful wide ResNet 40 with width 4 [35].
We analyze how the hyperparameters generalize across different OOD datasets. We tune the hyperparameters on one of five 
possible OOD datasets and tested on Tiny-ImageNet or LSUN dataset. Given those OOD datasets, we split each of them to 10% 
images for validation, and 90% images as test set. Firstly, we minimize the FPR at TPR 95% on one of the OOD dataset's 
validation set. Then we plot the threshold corresponding to TPR 95%, and apply this threshold for the test set of Tiny-ImageNet 
or LSUN dataset. Fig. xx shows that the hyperparameters tuned on different OOD validation sets can result on very similar FPR
performance on both of the Tiny-ImageNet and LSUN test sets. This may be because that the FPRs is quite small on all of the 
OOD datasets when we use the threshold corresponding to 95% TPR.
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Figure 3. FPR (for OOD) and TPR (for ID) under different δ
when using CIFAR-10 as the in-distribution dataset, and use Tiny-
ImageNet(resize), LSUN and Gaussian/Uniform noise as OOD.
CIFAR-10 only applicable to the TPR which use the dashed red
line and indicated by the right axis while the other OOD datasets
use the left FPR axis.
line), while FPR is used for OODs. We can observe that
the threshold corresponding to 95% TPR can produce small
FPRs on all OOD datasets. When the OOD images are sam-
pled from some simple distributions (e.g., Gaussian or Uni-
form), the available window of threshold δ can be larger.
Comparison with SOTA. The main results are sum-
marised in Table. 1. For each in&out-of-distribution pair,
we report the performance of ODIN [21], SUF [20] and our
DVN. Notably, DVN consistently outperforms the previous
methods and achieves a new state-of-the-art. As shown in
Table. 2 that the pre-processing and model change in ODIN
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(a) (b)Figure 4. Comparison with baseline MSP [13] using DenseNet,
with Tiny-ImageNet as in-distribution and LSUN as OOD.
CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
ODIN/SUF 4.81 22.37
DenseNet/DVN 4.51 22.27
Table 2. Test error rate of classification on CIFAR-10/100 using
DenseNet as backbone. Our DVN does not re-train or modify the
structure of the original trained classifier.
and SUF can unavoidably increase the error rate of the orig-
inal classification for in-distribution test, while DVN does
not affect the classification performance.
Considering the technical route of DVN is essentially
different from ODIN and SUF, we compare it with the base-
line, maximum softmax probability (MSP) [13], w.r.t. ROC
and PR in Fig. 4. DVN shares some nice properties of MSP,
e.g., fixed classifier and single forward pass at the test stage,
while DVN outperforms MSP by a large margin.
Ablation study. Disentangle y from z is critical to our
model. Table 3 validates the contribution of this manipula-
Disentangle TNR@TPR95% AUROC√
98.4 99.2
- 62.6 84.7
Table 3. The performance of DVN w/o disentanglement of y
from z with ResNet backbone, and using CIFAR-10/SVHN as in-
distribution/OOD, respectively.
p∗(z) TNR@TPR95% AUROC√
98.4 99.2
- 95.3 96.7
Table 4. The performance of DVN w/o replace p(z) with p∗(z).
We use ResNet backbone, and choose CIFAR-10/SVHN as in-
distribution/OOD.
tion w.r.t. both threshold dependent and independent met-
rics. One can easy to see that the DVN with disentangle-
ment can outperforms its counterparts which without disen-
tanglement significantly. This also implies DVN has suc-
cessfully learned to minimize the MI of z and y.
Since modeling p(x|y) is the core of DVN, we cannot
remove y. Here, we give another ablation study that without
modify p(z) with p∗(z). The results are shown in Table 4.
4.2. Verifying adversarial samples
Deal with popular adversarial attackers. To detect the
adversarial samples, we train our DenseNet and ResNet-
based classification network and DVN using the training set
of CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 or SVHN datasets, and their cor-
responding test sets are used as the positive samples for the
test. Following the setting in [20], we applied several attack
methods to generate the negative samples, such as basic it-
erative method (BIM) [18], Deepfool [23], Carlini-Wangner
(CW) [4]. The network structures are the same as OOD ver-
ification.
We compare DVN with the strategies in KD+PU [8],
LID [22], SUF [20] in Table 5, and show that the DVN can
achieve the the state-of-the-art performance in most cases
w.r.t. AUROC. Following the ”detection of unknown at-
tack setting”, we can not access to the adversarial examples
as the test stage in the training or validation. Therefore,
the previous works choose to use another attack generation
method, i.e., fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [10], to
construct a validation set of adversarial sample. In here,
we do not need another attack method as a reference, since
the threshold of DVN only related to the validation set of
in-distribution samples. Moreover, the pre-processing and
model change as in [20] are not required in DVN.
Deal with adaptive attackers be aware of deep veri-
fier In fact, our deep verifier cannot be fooled by white-box
adversarial attacks. The reason is a bit involved. Assume an
adversarial example x from class y but is misclassified as
y′. The decoder takes two inputs, the label y′ and the latent
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Figure 5. Distinguishing clean and garbage samples using ResNet
18 layers trained on CIFAR-10 dataset (as OOD) and compare
with the state-of-the-art methods w.r.t. TNR at TPR95%, AUROC,
and detection accuracy.
variable z. Adversarial samples are generated by modifying
inputs of classifiers to another sample that looks very simi-
lar but is not from the training distribution. However, in our
verifier model, we have perfect knowledge about the input
distribution of the decoder network, so no adversarial at-
tacks can fool the decoder network without being detected
(e.g. with a low p∗(z, y′) density). Although the encoder
network can be fooled with x, fooling the encoder network
alone is not enough to fool the entire verifier, because the
reconstruction of the decoder x′ (which is an image from
class y′) cannot match the input of the encoder x (which is
an image from class y) in this case. The verifier will output
a low-likelihood even if the encoder is fooled by adversar-
ial attacks, and there is no way to fool the decoder network.
This is in fact a core reason why our method works.
Deal with spatially transformed Adv and unrestricted
Adv The recently developed spatially transformed adversar-
ial examples [32] and unrestricted Adv [30] are not essen-
tially different from Lp normalized attackers for DVN. If
the attack can successfully fool classifier and predict y′ 6= y,
the conditional reconstruction will be unrealistic and has a
small likelihood. Even spatial transformation tends to bet-
ter preserve the perceptual quality, its conditional genera-
tion with y′ 6= y cannot keep this. Following Sec 4.2, using
DenseNet and CIFAR-10 as in-distribution, the AUROC(%)
of [32] and [30] are 84.2 and 87.8 respectively.
4.3. Verifying out-of-distribution samples for image
caption
For verifying OOD in image caption task, we choose
Oxford-102 and CUB-200 as the in-distribution datasets.
Oxford-102 contains 8,189 images of 102 classes of flower.
CUB-200 contains 200 bird species with 11,788 images.
Backbone Dataset Method Negative samples Input DeepFool CW BIMfor training Pre-processing
KD+PU FGSM - 68.34 53.21 3.10
CIFAR-10 LID FGSM - 70.86 71.50 94.55
SUF FGSM Yes 87.95 83.42 99.51
Our - - 90.14 86.38 99.42
KD+PU FGSM - 65.30 58.08 66.86
DenseNet CIFAR-100 LID FGSM - 69.68 72.36 68.62
SUF FGSM Yes 75.63 86.20 98.27
Our - - 80.01 88.55 99.04
KD+PU FGSM - 84.38 82.94 83.28
SVHN LID FGSM - 80.14 85.09 92.21
SUF FGSM Yes 93.47 96.95 99.12
Our - - 94.14 97.35 99.12
KD+PU FGSM - 76.80 56.30 16.16
CIFAR-10 LID FGSM - 71.86 77.53 95.38
SUF FGSM Yes 78.06 93.90 98.91
Our - - 82.45 95.51 99.07
KD+PU FGSM - 57.78 73.72 68.85
ResNet CIFAR-100 LID FGSM - 63.15 75.03 55.82
SUF FGSM Yes 81.95 90.96 96.38
Our - - 85.22 93.38 97.72
KD+PU FGSM - 84.30 67.85 43.21
SVHN LID FGSM - 67.28 76.58 84.88
SUF FGSM Yes 72.20 86.73 95.39
Our - - 86.13 89.38 96.10
Table 5. Comparison of AUROC (%) under different validation setups. The best results are bolded.
Each of them has 10 descriptions that are provided by [28].
For these two datasets, we use 80% samples to train our
captioner, and the remaining 20% for testing in a cross-
validation manner. The LSUN and Microsoft COCO dataset
are used as our OOD.
The captioner used in here is a classical image caption
model [33]. We choose the generator of GAN-INT-CLS
[29] as our decoder’s backbone, and replace its Normal dis-
tribution vector as the output of encoder z. A character level
CNN-RNN model [28] is used for the text embedding which
produces the 1,024-dimension vector given the description,
and then projected to a 128-dimension code c. We config-
ure the encoder and decoder with four convolutional layers
and the latent vector z is a 100-dimension vector. The input
of discriminator is the concatenation of z and c, which re-
sult in a 228-dimension vector. A two-layer fully connected
network with sigmoid output unit is used as the discrimina-
tor. Table 6 summarizes the performance of DVN in image
caption task and can be regarded as a powerful baseline.
5. Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we propose to enhance the performance of
anomaly detection by verifying predictions of deep discrim-
inative models using deep generative models. The idea is to
train a conditional verifier network q(x|y) as an approxima-
tion to the inverse posterior distribution. We propose our
model Deep Verifier Networks (DVN) which is based on
conditional variational auto-encoders with disentanglement
In-Dist OOD Validation on OOD samples
TNR@TPR 95% AUROC Verif acc.
CUB-200 55.6 72.3 79.5
Oxford-102 LSUN 50.5 71.8 76.2
COCO 40.3 74.4 73.3
Oxford-102 39.8 68.4 72.5
CUB-200 LSUN 36.3 65.4 69.5
COCO 35.4 60.7 71.0
Table 6. OOD verification results of image caption under different
validation setups. We use CUB-200, LSUN and COCO as the
OOD of Oxford-102, while using Oxford-102, LSUN and COCO
as OOD of CUB-200.
constraints. We show our model is able to achieve state-
of-the-art performance on benchmark OOD detection and
adversarial example detection tasks.
For future work, it would be interesting to integrate DVN
to safe AI systems. For instance, ordinary image classifiers
such as DenseNet have perfect accuracy for in-distribution
queries, but their behaviors are undefined on adversarial
queries. Robust image classifier sacrifices some accuracy
for robustness to adversarial examples. We can use DVN
to form a two step prediction procedure: first using an or-
dinary classifier to get an initial prediction, then verify the
prediction with DVN. If the prediction does not pass the
verification, we switch to the robust image classifier. We
believe our method would provide some illuminations for
AI safety systems.
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